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FEDERAL QUESTION JURISDICTION AND THE
DECLARATORY JUDGMENT ACT
I. INTRODUCTION
In order for a suit to be brought in federal district court as one
"arising under" the laws or Constitution of the United States, it must
meet severe restrictions on the pleading of a successful complaint
which have been established by Supreme Court precedents. These
restrictions were developed to apply to the conventional remedies
seeking damages or an injunction. The Declaratory Judgment Act,
however, provides an unconventional remedy and raises problems in
applying the old tests to a new type of action. It is the purpose of
this Note to identify and explore these problems and to point out the
need for a judicial clarification of their relationship.'
II. FEDERAL QUESTION JURISDICTION
Article III, section 2, of the Constitution gives to the federal courts
jurisdiction over "all cases, in law and equity, arising under the Con-
stitution, the laws of the United States, and treaties .. " In 1824 Chief
Justice Marshall gave a broad scope to the language of this section
in his opinion in Osborn v. Bank of the United States.2 In 1875 Con-
gress used its constitutional authority to bestow upon federal district
courts original jurisdiction over all cases arising under the Constitution
or laws of the United States, where a certain jurisdictional amount is
involved.3 With the exception of an amendment as to the jurisdictional
amount, this statute is practically unchanged today.4 The fact that
the statute adopted the same "arising under" terminology as was
used in the Constitution would seem to indicate that Congress in-
tended to confer upon the courts the full range of constitutional
power. The cases5 have not, however, given the statutory language
I The jurisdiction considered in this Note is original jurisdiction in the federal
courts and does not take into account Supreme Court review of state court de-
cisions.
2 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824). This case was in effect overruled by Con-
gress in the 1875 act granting jurisdiction. 18 Stat. 470 (1875), for extended
analysis see WRIGHT, FEDERAL CoURTs 48-50 (1963).
3 18 Stat. 470 (1875).
428 U.S.C. § 1331(a) (1949).
5 Gully v. First Nat'l Bank, 299 U.S. 109 (1936); Louisville and N.R.R. Co.
v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149 (1908); Tennessee v. Union and Planters' Bank, 152
U.S. 454 (1894).
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the broad scope that Chief Justice Marshall attributed to the same
constitutional language.6
These judicial interpretations have provided certain requirements
which must be met before a case can be said to "arise under" the
Constitution or laws of the United States for the purpose of
establishing original jurisdiction in a United States district court.
These requirements can be summarized in a single statement: the
existence of federal jurisdiction must appear from a federal question,
raised by a well-pleaded complaint,8 unaided by any anticipated de-
fense.0
More than seventy years ago the Supreme Court, in Tennessee v.
Union and Planter' Bank,'0 established the rule that a case arises
under the jurisdiction of the federal courts when the plaintiff's com-
plaint shows on its face that some right, title, or interest may be de-
feated by one construction of the federal law or Constitution or up-
held by another construction. Under this rule it appears that juris-
diction would be granted for any case in which plaintiff's complaint
shows that a federal question must be answered in the course of
adjudication.
The Court qualified this rule substantially in Louisville and N.R.R.
Co. v. Mottley," by requiring the plaintiff to allege an appropriate
complaint, unaided by any anticipated defense, which would dis-
close a real and substantial dispute; and any allegation which merely
anticipated defenses and was not essential to plaintiff's cause of action
had to be disregarded in the determination of jurisdiction.
In the Mottley case, the suit was brought for breach of contract.
The plaintiff alleged that the defendant railroad company based its
right to breach its contract with him on a federal statute, and if this
statute allowed defendant's breach, it was unconstitutional. The Court
held that the reference to defendant's reliance on the statute was in
anticipation of defense and not a part of the plaintiff's own cause of
action, and it dismissed the suit for lack of jurisdiction. The complaint
actually contained two issues. The first was a contract question, a non-
federal issue; the second was a constitutional question, but the Court
said the second did not arise until the federal defense was anticipated
and therefore could not be considered.12
6 Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824).
7Tennessee v. Union and Planters' Bank, 152 U.S. 454 (1894).8 Ibid. Gold v. Macy, 234 F. Supp. 764 (E.D.N.Y. 1964).
0 Louisville and N.R.R. Co. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149 (1908).
10 152 U.S. 454 (1894).
11211 U.S. 149 (1908).
121t would be interesting to know what the Court's attitude would have been
(Continued on next page)
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The Supreme Court has clearly stated that it will require more
than a federal question arising somewhere in the suit.'3 It stated the
real requirement in Gully v. First Nat'l Bank in Meridian14 when it
said:
To bring a case within the statute, a right or immunity created by the
Constitution or laws of the United States must be an element, and an
essential one of the plaintiff's cause of action. The right or immunity
must be such that it will be supported if the Constitution or laws of the
United States are given one construction or effect, and defeated if they
receive another. A genuine and present controversy, not merely a possible
or conjectural one, must exist with reference thereto, and the controversy
must be disclosed upon the face of the complaint, unaided by the answer
or by the petition for removal. Indeed, the complaint itself will not avail
as a basis of jurisdiction in so far as it goes beyond a statement of the
plaintiff's cause of action and anticipates or replies to a probable de-
fense.15
A 1964 case' attributed a meaning to the "well-pleaded complaint"
which the other cases had not previously discussed as a jurisdictional
requirement. It said that on a motion to dismiss a complaint for lack
of jurisdiction over the subject matter, well-pleaded facts, as distin-
guished from legal conclusions, are regarded as admissible. While this
should not place a serious limitation on jurisdiction, it is worth bear-
ing in mind when drawing the complaint.
It has been argued that since it is impossible for the complaint it-
self to raise any issues, the rule that only the complaint be considered
in the determination of jurisdiction is logically inconsistent with the
requirement of a substantial federal issue between the parties.' 7 The
converse of this argument is that if there is to be a limitation, the
complaint is the only logical place to draw the line. 8
III. THE DEcLARATORY JUDGMENT
The effort to establish the declaratory judgment remedy in the
United States was met with an abundance of judicial resistance. Court
hostility to declaratory relief was primarily based on a fear that such
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
if the Mottleys had based their claim solely on their constitutional right; i.e.,
alleging that the federal law sanctioned the breach of their contract and therefore
deprived them of their property without due process of law. For an example of
a cause of action based on a constitutional right, see Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678
(1946).
'13 Smith v. Kansas City Title and Trust Co., 255 U.S. 180 (1921).
14 299 U.S. 109 (1936).
15 Id. at 112-13.
16 Gold v. Macy, 234 F. Supp. 764 (E.D.N.Y. 1964).
17 37 CoLmU. L. REv. 1402 (1937).18 It would seem illogical and unduly burdensome to require the court to
wait until the adversary process takes place before it can dismiss for lack ofjurisdiction.
[Vol. 55,
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an expansion of the judicial function would endanger the case method
of law-making. In these early cases 19 the feeling was that declaratory
actions did not satisfy the "case or controversy" requirement. Congress
has made statutory provision for the declaratory judgment,20 and this
form of relief has become firmly established as a part of federal pro-
cedure. Our modem declaratory judgment procedure answers the
need for early adjudication of legal relations without doing away with
the adversary procedure. The issues to be settled are not moot or
hypothetical, but must be presented in a clash between adverse parties,
thus satisfying the "case or controversy" requirement.21
The Declaratory Judgment Act provides specifically that it does
not expand federal jurisdiction; therefore, a complaint must allege a
base of jurisdiction independent of the Declaratory Judgment Act.
Therein lies the conflict, because the declaratory judgment action is not
easily adapted to the jurisdictional requirements.
The Supreme Court partially dealt with this conflict vhen it denied
jurisdiction in Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co. 22 The Phillips
Company sought a declaratory judgment stating that its contracts
with the Skelly Oil Company and others were enforceable, basing
federal jurisdiction on the necessity of a construction of the Natural
Gas Act to show that the contract prerequisites were met within the
required time. The district court held that it had jurisdiction and
decided the case on its merits.2 3 After the court of appeals affirmed
the Supreme Court reversed, saying:
The Declaratory Judgment Act allowed relief to be given by way of
recognizing the plaintiff's right even though no immediate enforcement
of it was asked. But the requirements of jurisdiction-the limited sub-
ject matters which alone Congress has authorized the District Courts to
adjudicate-were not impliedly repealed or modified.24
The Court held that, even though the action is one for a declaratory
judgment, in order to invoke federal jurisdiction, the federal question
must be presented on the face of the plaintiff's complaint and not by
the plaintiff's anticipating a federal defense or by the defendant's
answer. It said the suit was on a contract, a state-created right, and
the plaintiff's artful pleading which attempted to raise a federal ques-
tion was merely anticipating a defense.
19 Liberty Warehouse Co. v. Burley Tobacco Grower's Co-Op. Marketing
Ass'n, 276 U.S. 71 (1928); Liberty Warehouse Co. v. Grannis, 273 U.S. 70(1927).
20 The Federal Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201, 2202 (1950);
FED. R. Civ. P. 57.
21 Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 229, 240-41 (1937).
2339 U.S. 667 (1950).
23 174 F.2d 89 (10th Cir. 1949).
24339 U.S. 667, 671 (1950).
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The fact that the Declaratory Judgment Act is not intended to en-
large or limit the jurisdiction of the federal courts2 5 complicates mat-
ters: when the typical case is brought under it, the parties are re-
versed. A petition for a declaration may assert as a cause of action
what would be a defense or a reply in a conventional suit. This is
because the party normally the defendant in a conventional suit may
bring an action for a declaratory judgment as the declaratory plain-
tiff.26 The result will be that the anticipated defenses of the con-
ventional suit may become the essential allegations of the declaratory
suit. The jurisdictional requirement that the federal right must appear
in the complaint becomes more complex when applied to the typical
declaratory judgment action. It brings forth the problem of whether a
plaintiff's complaint in a declaratory judgment suit, which states a
federal right that would only appear in his answer as a normal de-
fendant, will satisfy the well-pleaded complaint test. In cases of this
type several courts of appeals have answered this question by accept-
ing jurisdiction.2 7 In doing so, however, they displayed no realization
of the attached problems of reversal of the parties or of their deviation
from the policy of strict statutory construction. An excellent illustration
of a court's unawareness of a reversal of parties problem is Zaconick
v. City of Hollywood,28 where the district court stated: "It is obvious
that the suit is one which arises under the Federal Constitution...29
Although the following year the court of appeals said that this same
district court should not have accepted jurisdiction in a similar case,
its decision did not affect the reversal of parties ruling.30
If the court in Zaconick did understand the significance of its ac-
ceptance of jurisdiction and had been inspired to comment thereon, it
would probably have stated the following as a proposition of law: "If
the plaintiff sets forth a cause of action appropriate for declaratory
adjudication and a federal question is raised by the complaint, a dis-
trict court may properly assume jurisdiction even though, in a con-
ventional suit between the same parties, the federal question would
have arisen only as a defense." Acceptance of this view, however,
25 Skelly Oil co. v. Phillip's Petroleum Co., 339 U.S. 667 (1950).
26 Ibid.; Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 229 (1937).
27 Martinez v. Southern Ute Tribe, 273 F.2d 734 (10th Cir. 1959); Regents
of N.M. College of Agriculture and Mechanic Arts v. Albuquerque Broadcasting
Co., 158 F.2d 900 (10th Cir. 1947); Rambusch Decorating Co. v. Brotherhood of
'Painters, Decorators and Paperhangers of America, 105 F.2d 134 (2d Cir. 1939).
28 85 F. Supp. 52 (S.D. Fla. 1949).
29 Id. at 54.
30 Miami v. Sutton, 181 F.2d 644 (5th Cir. 1950). Here the court dealt with
a statute identical to the one in Zaconick, and dismissed the petition because the
federal courts do not interfere with enforcement of state criminal law, so if the
injunction sought were issued it could not be enforced.
[Vol. 55,
would constitute a deviation from the policy underlying the strict
construction of the congressional grant of jurisdiction by allowing ad-
mission to the federal courts of cases which, absent the declaratory
procedure, could not have entered. The consequence apparently would
be the opening of a whole new field of federal question jurisdiction
through the use of the procedural innovation called declaratory judg-
ment. On the other hand if federal question jurisdiction precedents
were narrowly applied, no declaratory action would be allowed in the
absence of diversity of citizenship, wherever the declaratory suit
sought to establish what otherwise could only be alleged in answer to
a coercive action.
IV. JUDICIAL TREATMENT OF ANALOGOUS PROBLEMS
Judicial precedents in other areas of law provide useful insights for
dealing with the problem of reversal of parties to establish federal
question jurisdiction for a declaratory judgment action. The "patent
cases," suits for alleged patent infringement, have been placed in a
distinct category due to their own particular needs. To indicate that
the federal question does not have to appear strictly on the face of
the plaintiff's cause of action in a suit for a declaratory judgment,
counsel for the plaintiff in the Skelly 3' case cited the patent cases. It
was argued that the federal courts often have jurisdiction over claims
for declaratory relief, even though no other type of action based upon
the same facts would meet the federal jurisdiction requirements. The
Court failed to mention these patent cases in its opinion, thus indica-
ting that an exception would be made for them as to requirements
of federal question jurisdiction.
Allowing the patent cases to stand, even if they do not fulfill the
jurisdictional requirements, serves a justifiable purpose. It is good
policy to allow the alleged infringer to bring the suit rather than
force him to wait until the patentee has sued him to determine the
validity of his defense. By simply refusing to bring the suit, continuing
to make public threats against the alleged infringer, and warning mer-
chants not to buy these goods from him, the patentee could force a set-
tlement without risking a judicial determination of his claims. Thereby
the business of the one charged with infringement would be injured
and he would have no remedy in a federal court. Since they were
made an exception to the Skelly rule, however, the alleged infringer is
allowed to bring the suit and thus to determine the validity of the
patentee's claim before he has suffered great damage.32
31339 U.S. 667 (1950).32 Note, 45 Y.LE L.J. 160 (1935).
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Reversal of parties has also created a problem in insurance cases.
In these cases the insured normally has the burden of proof, since, as
plaintiff, he must prove his claim. Under the declaratory judgment
procedure, however, it is often the insurer who seeks a declaration of
nonliability. Some courts have held that in such a case the burden of
proof remains on the insured, 33 which indicates that the insured is the
true plaintiff. If this approach were carried over into federal question
jurisdiction, it would indicate that the party having the conventional
coercive cause of action would be the true plaintiff, and his cause of
action would be determinative of jurisdiction.
V. CONCLUSION
It will not be a simple task to formulate a reasonably uniform set
of guides to establish federal question jurisdiction under the Declara-
tory Judgment Act. The only substantial Supreme Court consideration
was more than sixteen years ago, when the Court said by way of
dictum that it would distort the limited procedural purpose of the
Declaratory Judgment Act to permit a party by artful pleading to anti-
cipate a defense based on federal law and thus to bring a suit within
federal jurisdiction which could not otherwise be heard in federal
court.
3 4
The need for judicial clarification of the relationship between
federal question jurisdiction and the declaratory judgment is clearly
shown by the federal courts' acceptance of these cases with apparently
no realization of the reversal of parties problem.3 5 The commentators
seem to agree that there are two possible approaches to this problem.
The complaint in a declaratory judgment action may be judged on its
own merits; if it reveals a federal claim, then jurisdiction will exist.
The alternative is to permit the declaratory judgment action to be en-
tertained in federal court only if the coercive action which would have
been brought, absent declaratory judgment procedure, might have
been so brought.36 The American Law Institute's proposed revision of
federal question jurisdiction recognizes these two alternatives and of-
fers an indirect resolution of the conflict. Under this proposal, the
declaratory action would be appropriately within federal jurisdiction
under either alternative, since each party would be given a right to
33 State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Smith, 48 F. Supp. 570 (W.D. Mo.
1942); Travelers Ins. Co. v. Greenough, 88 N.H. 391, 190 Ad. 129 (1937).
34 Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillip's Petroleum Co., 339 U.S. 667 (1950).35 Zaconick v. City of Hollywood, 85 F. Supp. 52 (S.D. Fla. 1949); see also
text at note 27 and cases in note 27 supra.3 6 WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURITS 53-54 (1963); 1 BARRON & HoLT-zoFF § 39, at
209-11 (Wright ed.); Mishkin, The Federal Question in the District Courts, 53
COLUm. L. REv. 157, 177-84 (1953).
(Vol. 55,
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remove the case from a state to a federal court as soon as the federal
question is injected into the pleading process.37
It is this writer's opinion that the conflict between the jurisdic-
tional requirements of pleading a federal question and the Declaratory
Judgment Act will resolve itself toward allowing meritorious cases en-
trance into federal courts by extending the field of exceptions, such
as those existing for patent and insurance litigation. The best solution
to the problem, whether through a far-reaching decision or a series of
exceptions, would be one which would give the greatest protection to
all claims which will require in the course of their adjudication the
resolution of a substantial federal question. An overcrowded docket
should not stand in the way of a citizen's determination of his federal
rights. If necessary, our federal court system should be expanded to
meet the needs of the people.
James W. Barnett
37 ALI, SrUDY OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDIcrION Bm'rw STATE AND FED-
ERAL CoURTs (GENERAL FEDERAL QUESTION JURSDICTION) § 1812, at 5 (Tent.
Draft No. 3, 1965).
